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NOTES
Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States: The Demise of
Congressionally Mandated Countervailing Duties
The countervailing duty has long been a favorite tool of the Con-
gress to achieve what it considers to be fair trade between the United
States and her trading partners. Countervailing duties are extra duties
imposed upon goods that enjoy subsidies, in whatever form, from a
foreign government. In Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States,' the
Supreme Court agreed with the Department of Treasury that a remis-
sion by the Government of Japan of a domestic indirect2 commodity
tax upon electronic goods was not a subsidy requiring a countervailing
duty. This Note will suggest that the Court's dependence upon the leg-
islative history of the countervailing duty statute, the longstanding
practice of the Treasury Department, and the reliance interests that
have arisen because of this practice, are misplaced. Rather, an analysis
of circumstances surrounding the case reveals that it is unarticulated
political considerations, such as pressure from the Government of Ja-
pan and the Department of State, which make logic of an otherwise
illogical decision.
In April, 1970, Zenith filed a petition with the Commissioner of
Customs, 3 seeking the imposition of a countervailing duty upon elec-
1 437 U.S. 443 (1978). Zenith alleged in its complaint that the tax remission by the Govern-
ment of Japan should be countervailed under § 303(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1303(a) (1976), which provides in relevant part that:
(1) Whenever any country, dependency, colony, province or other political subdivision of
government, person, partnership, association, cartel, or corporation shall pay or bestow,
directly, any bounty or grant upon the manufacture or production or export of any arti-
cle. . . then upon the importation of such article or merchandise into the United States
. . . there shall be levied and paid, in all such cases, in addition to any other duties
otherwise imposed, a duty equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant, however the
same be paid or bestowed.
2 The term "indirect" tax usually refers to four major types of taxes: excise taxes, sales taxes,
stamp taxes, and customs duties. See generally J. DuE, INDIRECT TAXATION IN DEVELOPING
ECONOMIES 1-99 (1970). While an indirect tax system causes higher prices to consumers, it allows
a greater rate of savings that can then be used for capital formation. Id. at 8-12. Direct taxes,
particularly on corporate income, primarily absorb funds that otherwise would be used for capital
formation. Id. Further, indirect taxes reduce the consumption of imported luxury goods because
of the higher prices; the net effect is to lessen the drain on foreign exchange reserves and to facili-
tate the importation of goods necessary for optimal capital formation. Id.
3 The Secretary of the Treasury has delegated the authority to make countervailing duty
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tronics products4 exported from Japan to the United States. The peti-
tioner alleged that Japan's remissions of a tax levied under the
Commodity Tax Law of Japan5 constituted a bounty or grant because
the return of the commodity tax when the goods were exported had
conferred a direct or indirect benefit upon the Japanese producers. Af-
ter an investigation 6 and without providing any reasons, the Commis-
sioner rejected Zenith's petition.
Zenith subsequently filed suit in Customs Court7 disputing this
finding. 8 The Treasury Department, on behalf of the Commissioner,
argued in defense that the statute did not require assessment of a coun-
tervailing duty because the remission of the commodity tax in issue was
non-excessive. 9  The three-judge panel, 10  however, unanimously
granted Zenith's motion for summary judgement as a matter of law,"
holding that the remission was clearly encompassed by the statutory
language of section 303(a). The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
reversed in a three-to-two decision, holding that the remission did not
constitute a bounty or grant within the meaning of the statute.' 2 The
determinations to the Commissioner of Customs, subject to the Secretary's approval. 19 C.F.R. §
159.47 (1977).
4 The products were television receivers, picture tubes, radios, radio-phonographs, radio-pho-
nograph-television combinations, record and tape players, and tape recorders. 437 U.S. at 446 n.5.
5 Law No. 48 of 1962. Under this law, television receivers, sound equipment and other con-
sumer durable goods, such as cars, boats and appliances are called Class 2 Commodities. Id.
Televisions are taxed at a rate of 15-20% of the wholesale price while the other mentioned goods
are taxed at a rate of 15-30%. Id.
6 41 Fed. Reg. 1298 (1976).
7 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 242 (Cust. Ct. 1977).
8 In 1975 Congress authorized American manufacturers, producers and wholesalers to seek
review in the Customs Court of decisions against the imposition of a countervailing duty. 19
U.S.C. § 1516(d) (1976). This provision was enacted in response to a holding that the courts
lacked jurisdiction to review such determinations. United States v. Hammond Lead Products,
Inc., 440 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
9 437 U.S. at 447.
10 Upon the government's motion, the chief judge of the Customs Court appointed a three-
judge panel pursuant to § 108 of the Customs Court Act of 1970, 28 U.S.C. § 225(a) (1970). Sec-
tion 108 provides that:
Upon application of any party to a civil action. . . the chiefjudge of the Customs Court shall
designate any three judges of the court to hear and determine any civil action which the chief
judge finds. . . has broad or significant implications in the administration or interpretation
of the customs laws.
Id.
11 430 F. Supp. at 265.
12 United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 562 F.2d 1209, 1223 (C.C.P.A. 1977). Whether this
court decided the issue as a question of law or fact is unclear. See generally Development, Cur-
toms Law-Countervailing Duties-Nonexessive Remission ofExcise Tax by Japanese Government
is Not a Bounty or Grant Within Section 303 of the Tariff/Act of 1930, as Amended by 19 U.S. C.
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Supreme Court granted certiorari on February 12, 1978.13
In affirming the decision of the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals, the Supreme Court based its opinion upon four considerations. 14
First, the legislative history of the various Tariff Acts revealed that
Congress did not intend the countervailing duty statute to apply to
nonexcessive remissions of indirect taxes. 15 Second, the construction
that the Secretary of Treasury had placed upon the statute was deemed
to be reasonable in light of the statutory purpose of preventing unfair
competition, regardless of what the legislative history might indicate.16
Third, since the Treasury Department's interpretation was longstand-
ing and had been incorporated into the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT),17 it had created substantial reliance interests, and
thus, it would "not be disturbed except for cogent reasons."' 8 Finally,
Zenith's reliance upon Downs v. United States'9 was misplaced because
that case involved not only the remission of an indirect tax, as was the
case in Zenith, but also the granting of a commercially valuable certifi-
cate.20
This note will first examine the correctness of the Zenith Court's
interpretation of the purpose and effect of the congressional amend-
ments to the 189021 and 189422 countervailing duty statutes. Secondly,
it will compare the Zenith decision with prior case law that had inter-
preted the countervailing duty statutes, consistent with the congres-
sional intent and command, to encompass nonexcessive remissions of
indirect taxes.23 Thirdly, it will criticize in the light of current methods
of economic analysis the eighty year-old position of the Treasury De-
partment which maintains that all indirect taxes are completely shifted
forward to the consumer.24 Finally, the Note will analyze the trade
§ 1303 (Supp. V 1975), 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 573 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Customs Law]; De-
velopment, Export Subsidies-Countervailing Duties, 10 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 577 (1978).
13 434 U.S. 1060 (1978).
14 437 U.S. at 450-62.
15 Id. at 450-54.
16 Id. at 454-57.
17 Id. at 457. Article VI (3) of GATT, adopted in 1947, 61 Stat. A24, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 (1947),
provides that: "[n]o product... imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall
be subject to. . .countervailing duty by reason of the exemption of such product from. . . taxes
borne by the like product when destined for consumption in the country of origin or exportation,
or by reason of the refund of such . . . taxes."
18 437 U.S. at 457-58.
19 187 U.S. 496 (1903).
20 437 U.S. at 459-62.
21 26 Stat. 567, 584 (1890) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1976)).
22 28 Stat. 151 (1897) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1976)).
23 See text accompanying notes 53-68 infra.
24 See text accompanying notes 96-103 infra.
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disequilibrium that has developed between Japan and the United
States partly because of Japan's tax remission systems25-a develop-
ment with which the Treasury Department and the Court should come
to terms.
CONGRESSIONAL EXTENSION OF THE SCOPE OF COUNTERVAILING
DUTIES
Congress first authorized the imposition of countervailing duties in
the Tariff Acts of 189026 and 189427 in order to combat German subsi-
dies of sugar exported to the United States.28 These statutes exempted
foreign sugar exporters from the payment of countervailing duties if it
could be shown that the triggering bounty paid by the foreign govern-
ment did not exceed the tax collected by that government upon the
sugar or the beets from which the sugar was produced.29 In the Tariff
Act of 1897,30 Congress expanded the statute, imposing countervailing
duties on all imported products subject to duties that had benefited
from either "bounties" or "grants. ' 31 In other words, the counter-
vailing duty was intended to offset any unfair advantage derived from
the bounty or grant that dutiable products exported to the United
States enjoyed.
Relying heavily upon the 1897 floor debates, the Zenith Court em-
phasized the continuity and similarity that existed between these three
Tariff Acts.32 The Court noted, for example, that the senator who
sponsored the 1897 amendment had commented that it was an imita-
tion of the 1894 countervailing duty on sugar.33 In addition, the Court
referred to the extended floor discussion about the effect of the 1897
statute upon German sugar imports.34 Moreover, an analysis of the
legislative history of the Tariff Act of 1897 led the Court to conclude
that Congress used the term "net amount '35 in the 1897 statute to mean
25 See note 103 infra.
26 Note 21 supra.
27 Note 22 supra.
28 437 U.S. at 451-52.
29 Id. at 453.
30 30 Stat. 151 (1897) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1976)).
31 See text accompanying notes 58-60 infra for further discussion of the word "grant".
32 437 U.S. at 451-55.
33 Id. at 453.
34 Id. at 454.
35 In the 1894 statute, Congress stated that only a "net bounty", ie., a remission in excess of
taxes paid or otherwise due, triggered the countervailing duty. 28 Stat. 521 (current version at 19
U.S.C. § 1303(a)(1976)). The Zenith Court argued that the "net bounty" term of the 1894 statute
and the "net amount" term of the 1897 statute were essentially functional equivalents. 437 U.S. at
453.
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the amount remitted in excess of domestic excise taxes already paid.36
The Court noted in support of its arguments that Senator Jones, the
author of the provision in the 1894 Tariff Act that exempted nonexces-
sive tax remissions from a countervailing duty,37 had characterized the
difference between the amounts received upon exportation and the
amounts already paid in taxes as the "net bounty" upon exportation. 38
The Court further observed that Senator Allison, the sponsor of the
1897 amendment, had considered the bounty contemplated by his pro-
posed countervailing duty statute to be the net bounty less any taxes
and reductions. 39
This exegesis of the legislative history, however, is much less con-
vincing than the Zenith Court's interpretation would lead one to be-
lieve. Notwithstanding the remarks of Senators Jones and Allison,
Congress did delete the 1894 Jones proviso, which had exempted
nonexcessive remissions of indirect taxes, when it enacted the 1897 stat-
ute.40 Thus, it is only reasonable to assume that, if the legislature had
meant to exempt the nonexcessive remission of taxes, it would have left
the 1894 exemption in its place rather than going to the trouble of re-
pealing it. Several remarks made during the legislative debate of the
1897 statute lend credence to this assumption.
During the congressional debates on the 1897 statute, Senator Caf-
fery pointed out that American retaliatory action is sometimes neces-
sary for self-preservation. 4' Conceding that it is generally good policy
to accept less expensive goods,42 he argued that such a policy becomes
inappropriate when there is sufficient inducement, in the form of a
bounty or grant given by a foreign government to its producers, to ex-
port and thereby to destroy American industry.43 Furthermore, Repre-
sentative Meyer of Louisiana, a delegate from the heart of the
American sugar cane growing industry, emphatically declared:
36 437 U.S. at 453-54.
37 The exemption specified:
That the importer of sugar produced in a foreign country, the Government of which grants
such direct or indirect bounties, may be relieved from this additional duty under such regula-
tions as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe, in case said importer produces a certifi-
cate of said government that no indirect bounty has been received upon said sugar in excess
of the tax collected upon the beet or cane from which it was produced, and that no direct
bounty has been or shall be paid ....
28 Stat. 521 (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1976)).
38 437 U.S. at 452, citing 26 Cong. Rec. 5705 (1894).
39 Id. at 454, citing 30 Cong. Rec. 1721 (1897).
40 Compare 28 Stat. 509, 521 (1894) with 30 Stat. 151 (1897).
41 30 Cong. Rec. 2205 (1897).
42 See note 118 infra for further discussion of this point within the context of the economic
doctrine of comparative advantage.
43 30 Cong. Rec. 2205 (1897).
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We do not say to [foreign supporters] you shall or shall not impose this
tax or this bounty, but we do say that when we find your export bounty or
other device enables you to come here and undersell our own people, we
will meet you at the shore with a countervailing duty about which there
will be no quibbling or mistake.44 (Emphasis added.)
He urged Congress to place a countervailing duty on all remissions,
whether excessive or not.
45
Thus, the legislative commentary which the Zenith Court cited
does indeed support its decision that nonexcessive remissions were not
to be countervailed. However, the repeal in 1897 of the exemption con-
tained in the 1894 Act and other statements in the legislative history of
the 1897 Act strongly suggest just the opposite.
The selective use in Zenith of the commentary from legislative de-
bates is particularly inappropriate because the Court has recognized in
the past that such speeches given on the floor in Congress are unrelia-
ble sources of information for determining the meaning of statutory
language. In United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n,4 6 the Court
reasoned that it is impossible to ascertain with any certainty what con-
struction attaches to legislation by referring to the speeches of indivi-
dual members of the enacting legislatures. Instead, as the Court
pointed out in United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co. ,47 legislative in-
tent is more reliably determined by reference to reports of committees
or their members.
In Zenith, the Court made no reference to any such committee or
committee member reports. The Court's selective reliance on the Jones
and Allison statements was therefore misguided, especially in light of
the contradictory statements made by Caffery and Meyer during the
same debates.
The history of the present countervailing duty statute, however,
does not stop with the Tariff Act of 1897, even though the Zenith Court
never mentioned any subsequent tariff legislation. Congress signifi-
cantly enlarged the scope of countervailing duty protection under the
Tariff Acts of 1909,48 1913,49 and 1922.50 The new statutes extended
the reach of countervailing duties to include bounties or grants on man-
ufacture or production, not just exportation, by inserting the phrase
44 Id. at 318.
45 Id.
46 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
47 315 U.S. 110 (1941). See text accompanying notes 77-92 infra for further discussion of
Senate committee reports on the scope of the countervailing duty statute.
48 36 Stat. 11, 85 (1909) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1976)).
49 38 Stat. 114, 193-94 (1913) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1976)).
50 42 Stat. 858, 935-36 (1922) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1976)).
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"upon the manufacture or production or export of any article." 5' The
practical effect of these amendments was to make the countervailing
duty law applicable to any foreign bounty or grant, regardless of
whether the foreign bounty or grant was specifically designed to en-
courage exportation or to resolve domestic, fiscal, or production
problems.52 Hence, this broad expansion of the reach of the counter-
vailing duty statute attained by the amendments of 1909, 1913, and
1922 is a direct reflection of congressional intent to counteract any ac-
tion taken by foreign governments which confers any benefits upon
their producers exporting to the United States.
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE COUNTERVAILING DUTY STATUTE
Until Zenith, the Court had consistently given effect to the broad
congressional purpose of offsetting all benefits conferred by a foreign
government upon its exporters. The Court first interpreted the counter-
vailing duty statute in 1903 in Downs v. United States.53 In Downs, the
Court considered a complicated program to stimulate sugar production
in which the Russian government (1) remitted a domestic tax upon
sugar and (2) gave exporting producers a negotiable certificate.5 4 With-
out holding that the remission was a bounty in and of itself, the Court
concluded that the Russian scheme as a whole bestowed a bounty upon
exporters. 55 Thus, the Court held that the imposition of a counter-
vailing duty upon the Russian sugar was mandatory under the Tariff
Act of 1897.56
In Zenith, the Court found that the bestowal of the certificate in
Downs was the dispositive factor in that Court's decision. 57 Specific
language in the Downs decision, however, indicates that the statute was
interpreted more broadly than that. Justice Brown, writing for the ma-
jority in Downs, stated that "[w]hen a tax is imposed upon all sugar
produced, but is remitted upon all sugar exported, then, by whatever
process, or in whatever manner, or under whatever name it is disguised,
it is'a bounty upon exportation."58 (Emphasis added). Moreover, the
51 Id.
52 See Comment, United States Countervailing Duty Law. Renewed, Revamped and Revis-
ited-TradeAct of 1974, 17 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 832 (1976).
53 187 U.S. at 502-512.
54 Id. at 516.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 437 U.S. at 461.
58 187 U.S. at 516.
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Zenith Court ignored the point raised by Zenith in its briefP9 that the
Downs Court had explicitly stated that a remission of domestic sales or
commodity tax upon exportation is an example of an indirect bounty.60
The Court's attempt to distinguish Downs from Zenith was therefore
misguided.
Nor is there any explanation for the Zenith Court's summary dis-
missal61 of G.S. Nicholas & Co. v. United States,62 the only other
Supreme Court case construing the countervailing duty statute. In that
case, the British government had remitted a domestic tax levied upon
certain alcoholic beverages and paid a small allowance when these
products were exported. The Treasury Department then imposed a
countervailing duty that was upheld by all three reviewing tribunals.63
The Zenith Court dismissed Nicholas in a footnote because the British
program at issue had included a direct bounty.64
This dismissal, though, is unsatisfying given the sweeping pro-
nouncements and the similar rationes decidendae of all three reviewing
courts. The Board of General Appraisers, the precursor of the Customs
Court, relied heavily upon the language in Downs when it stated that
any remission of taxes is a bounty under the Tariff Act.65 The Court of
Customs Appeals then held that the sole inquiry in such cases is
whether the foreign remission of an indirect tax upon export to the
United States enables the exported goods to be sold at a lower price in
competition with American goods.66 In affirming the Customs Court,
the Supreme Court went on to declare that "[i]f the word 'bounty' has a
limited sense, the word 'grant' has not. A word of broader significance
could not have been used." 67 The Court further noted that a grant is a
"concession, the conferring of something by one person upon an-
other."6 8
It is submitted that the expansive language in Downs and G.S.
Nicholas is fully consistent with the intent of Congress to exercise fully
59 Brief for Petitioner at 14.
60 187 U.S. at 515.
61 437 U.S. at 459 n.15.
62 187 U.S. 34 (1919).
63 29 Treas. Dec. 59 (Bd. Gen. App. 1915), aFd, 7 Ct. Cust. App. 97 (1917), a f'd, 249 U.S. 34
(1919).
64 Note 61 supra.
65 29 Treas. Dec. 59, 64 (Bd. Gen. App. 1915).
66 7 Ct. Cust. App. 97, 107 (1916).
67 249 U.S. 34, 39 (1919).
68 Id.
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its power under the commerce clause69 to impose countervailing duties
upon goods that have received any benefits, direct or indirect.70 More-
over, it is also consistent with the Court's practice, as shown in income
tax cases decided by it, of giving full rein to Congress to lay and collect
taxes on income, from whatever source derived. 7' In a nutshell, then,
the Zenith Court's sudden decision to check Congress' exercise of its
power over foreign commerce is inconsistent with prior decisions and
policies.
EXECUTIVE AGENCY INTERPRETATION OF ENABLING LEGISLATION
The Zenith Court adopted the interpretation of the countervailing
duty statute espoused by the Secretary of the Treasury.72 In the Court's
view, that interpretation furthered the statutory purpose of section
303(a) to prevent unfair competition. 73 The legislative history sur-
rounding the Secretary's interpretation reveals that this is simply not
SO.
The Secretary had consistently ruled that a nonexcessive remission
of an indirect tax was not a subsidy but a means of avoiding double
taxation by both the exporting and importing countries. 74 This long-
standing administrative policy, the Court reasoned, had encouraged
substantial reliance interests among America's major trading partners
and had even been incorporated into the GATT.75 Thus, only "cogent
reasons" could justify a change in policy.76
However reasonable the Secretary's interpretation of the counter-
vailing duties statute seemed to the Court,77 Congress has refused to
69 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, which reads in pertinent part: "The Congress shall have Power To
... regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and among the several States ....
70 See notes 41-52 and accompanying text supra.
71 See generally Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77 (1977); Commissioner v. Glenshaw
Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955); United States v. Kirby Lumber Co. 284 U.S. 1 (1931); Old Colony
Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
72 437 U.S. at 457.
73 Id. at 456.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 457.
76 Id. at 457-58.
77 The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals also found the Secretary's position to be entitled
to considerable weight because the Congress reenacted the statute without change and failed to
revise the statute in the face of the Treasury Department's practice. 562 F.2d at 1219. But see the
decision of the Board of General Appraisers in Nicholas where it is stated that the Downs deci-
sion, which held that nonexcessive tax remissions triggered countervailing duties, is the one
"which Congress is presumed to have adopted rather than that given in the brief letter of the
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury." 29 Treas. Dec. at 64. Cf. note 95 infra where the Court
stated that Congress' silence cannot baptize a statutory gloss.
326
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endorse it at least six times. In 195078 and 195 179 Congress explicitly
rejected proposals that would have excluded from the scope of the
countervailing duty law a foreign government's remissions of, or ex-
emption from, taxes on goods exported to the United States.80 A simi-
lar refusal occurred in 1968.81 In 1970, in addition to declining to enact
the Treasury Department's proposed amendment, a Senate report ex-
plained the Senate's awareness of the Supreme Court cases (Downs and
Nicholas) and of a 1970 Customs Court case that had interpreted the
words "bounty" and "grant" to apply to virtually all subsidies, "includ-
ing the rebate of indirect taxes."18 2 In 1973, the Treasury Department's
position was again rejected.8 3
The most recent refusal to enact the Treasury Department's inter-
pretation came with the Trade Act of 1974.84 The Senate Finance
Committee declared that the purpose of the Trade Act was to provide,
among other things, close, continuing congressional oversight of inter-
national trade and effective import relief to domestic industries that are
seriously injured or threatened with injury by increased imports. 85 The
Senate then strongly criticized the Executive's implementation of the
trade statutes.
Too often the Executive has granted trade concessions to accomplish po-
litical objectives. Rather than conducting U.S. international economic re-
lations on sound economic and commercial principles, the Executive has
used trade and monetary policy in a foreign aid context. An example has
been the Executive's unwillingness to enforce U.S. trade statutes in re-
sponse to foreign trade practices. 86
78 H.R. 8304, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
79 H.R. 1535, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
80 430 F. Supp. at 253 (Newman, J., concurring) (citing the proposed Customs Simplification
Act of 1950, H.R. 8304, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.). The bill was referred to the Committee on Ways
and Means, 96 Cong. Rec. 6075, 6119 (1950), where it died. [1949-1950 Transfer Binder] Cong.
Index (CCH) 3664. As Judge Newman pointed out: "A reasonable conclusion from the Congres-
sional rejection of the Treasury's proposed amendments in 1950 and 1951 is that Congress was
satisfied with the way it had earlier written the statute, and approved of the Supreme Court's
construction of the law." Id. at 254.
81 2 S. COMM. ON FIN., COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OF UNITED
STATES TRADE POLICIES, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 475-76, 568-69, 887-89, 918-19 (1968).
82 S. REP. No. 91-1431, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 278-81 (1970).
83 In its consideration of the Trade Act of 1974 in 1973, the House Ways and Means Commit-
tee specifically noted that it did not "express approval or disapproval of the standard employed by
the Treasury Department in administering the countervailing duty law with regard to the treat-
ment under that law of rebates or remissions of direct and indirect taxes." H.R. REP. No. 93-571,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1973).
84 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 19, 26, 31 U.S.C.).
85 S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
7186, 7187 [hereinafter cited as Report].
86 Id. at 7193. Several sources have commented upon the Executive's obvious unwillingness
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This criticism applies in full force to the position taken by the Treasury
Department, as it is the executive agency responsible for enforcing the
trade statutes.
The Senate report further noted that even though the United
States is a party to the GATT, such membership need not completely
determine U.S. trade policies because the GATT is often either inap-
propriate in today's complex world economy or is observed only in the
breach.8 7 In support of these observations, the Committee declared
that there are too many nontariff barriers to, and distortions of, trade.88
They include quotas, variable levies, border taxes, discriminatory pro-
curement and internal taxation practices, rules of origin requirements,
and subsidies.8 9 The Committee specifically stated that implicit pay-
ments through a reduction of a particular tax liability constitute subsi-
dies.90
The view that Congress intended indirect tax remissions to be
countervailed receives further support from statements of the Senate
Finance Committee. In a committee print, it declared that the counter-
vailing duty law is meant to counter the subsidy effect of indirect tax
remissions upon exports.91 It then noted that the law has not been ap-
plied even though couched in mandatory terms.92
The consistent refusal of Congress to adopt the Treasury Depart-
ment's interpretation of section 303(a) and the legislative reports sur-
rounding these refusals reveal congressional disapproval of the
executive's lax enforcement of the countervailing duty statutes. Indeed,
these legislative developments indicate that, contrary to the interpreta-
to impose countervailing duties when politically expedient. See, e.g., Hearings on HA 10710
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 504 (1974). One author has
stated that:
the mandatory requirement to countervail is desirable because it offsets the natural tendency
of the Executive Branch to avoid a confrontation which might make the conduct of foreign
affairs more difficult.
Butler, Countervailing Duties and Export Subsidization: A Reemerging Issue in International Trade,
9 VA. J. INT'L L. 82, 145 (1968). See also Customs Law, supra note 12, at 844-45, arguing that
Treasury's position flies in the face of the statute's mandatory language.
87 Report, supra note 85, at 7304. Of further interest, it may be noted that the Protocol of
Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade provides that GATT
shall be applied to the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legislation. 61 Stat. A205 1,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700 (1947).
88 Report, supra note 85, at 7224.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 SENATE FINANCE COMM., 92D CONG., 1ST SESS., FOREIGN TRADE: A SURVEY OF CUR-
RENT ISSUES TO BE STUDIED BY THE SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON FINANCE 14 (Comm. Print 1971).
92 Id.
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tion espoused by the Treasury Department in Zenith, Congress in-
tended to continue to command the imposition of countervailing duties
upon all indirect tax remissions by foreign governments.
In the past, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to overrule an
erroneous interpretation of an enabling statute by an administrative
agency. For example, in 1969, in Zuber v. Allen,93 the Court unhesitat-
ingly overruled the administrative construction of a statute because "it
[was] only one input in the interpretational equation. ' 94 The Court
recognized that its duty was to construe the language used by Congress
when the agency has clearly missed the mark.95 Therefore, as it is clear
that the Treasury Department's interpretation of section 303(a) is not in
accord with Congressional intent, the reasonableness of that interpreta-
tion vanishes. The Zenith Court failed to recognize this fact.
ECONOMIC RATIONALE
The Treasury Department justifies its practice of not counter-
vailing indirect taxes such as the Japanese Commodity Tax by arguing
that they are "completely neutral;" that is, they are not absorbed by the
producer but instead are shifted completely forward to the consumer.96
It maintains that an exporting country's remission of an indirect tax
therefore merely avoids double taxation and puts manufacturers of dif-
ferent countries on an equal footing.97 Although this rationale may
have been thought to be sound in the 1890's, subsequent developments
in economic theory shed new light on the impact of indirect taxation
and prove the economic unreasonableness of the Secretary's position.
Firstly, the Treasury's assertion that an indirect tax is "completely
neutral' is a definitional misstatement. If the tax were indeed "neu-
tral," it would be paid by producers and consumers equally.98 Sec-
ondly, and more importantly, basic economic theory teaches that the
party who bears the tax incidence is a function of the relative elastici-
93 396 U.S. 168 (1969).
94 Id. at 192.
95 Id. at 193. The Zuber Court noted that:
The verdict of quiescent years cannot be invoked to baptize a statutory gloss that is
otherwise impermissible. . .Congressional inaction frequently betokens unawareness, pre-
occupation, or paralysis .... Where, as in the case before us, there is no indication that a
subsequent Congress has addressed itself to the particular problem, we are unpersuaded that
silence is tantamount to acquiescence, let alone the approval discerned by the dissent.
396 U.S. at 198.
96 Brief for the United States at 17, n.10.
97 Id.
98 The word "neutral" implies that neither side is favored. If the tax is shifted forward to the
consumers, then the producers are favored by the tax, and the situation is not "neutral."
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ties of supply and demand.99 When the demand curve for a product is
completely elastic, I00 the producer will absorb the cost of the tax, and
when the demand curve is totally inelastic, the consumers will bear the
cost of the tax.101 The burden of the tax will only be shifted completely
to the consumer when the demand curve for the product is completely
inelastic-a very unlikely situation.10 2 Thus, the Treasury Department
has failed to recognize that, in the real world, indirect taxes fall upon
both the consumer and the producer in varying degrees depending
upon the elasticity of demand for the particular product.
This failure of the Treasury Department officially to give effect to
basic principles of micro-economics has resulted in a policy that penal-
99 P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 389-90 (10th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as P. SAMUELSON].
100 The following diagram from P. SAMUELSON, supra note 99, at 389, Fig. 20-6, and discussion
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The solid line dd is the demand curve. The line ss is the initial supply curve, the line s's' is
the supply curve after a one dollar tax has been imposed. The points E and E' are the respective
equilibrium points. A one dollar tax shifts ss up one dollar everywhere to give a parallel supply
curve s's'. This line intersects dd at the new equilibrium point of E', where the price to the con-
sumer has risen $2/3 above the old equilibrium point E, and where the price to the producer has
fallen by $1/3. The dotted lines and accompanying arrows show the change in P and Q. If the
demand curve (dd) were completely elastic and flat relative to the supply curve (ss), all of the one
dollar tax would fall on the producer. If the supply curve (ss) were totally horizontal and thus
completely inelastic, the whole tax would be shifted forward onto the consumer.
101 p. SAMUELSON, supra note 99, at 389-400.
102 Id.
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izes American producers, for they must compete with foreign goods
that in effect receive a government subsidy due to the remission of indi-
rect taxes. It is true, however, that a tax remission may only be margin-
ally effective in giving foreign producers a competitive edge, depending
upon the relative efficiencies of the American and foreign producers.
Therefore, in the instant case, if Zenith is at least as efficient as its Japa-
nese counterparts, any price differential must be attributed to the re-
mission of indirect taxes by the Japanese government when the goods
are exported.10 3 Nevertheless, the remission of taxes upon the exporta-
tion of goods to the United States is no less a government subsidy be-
cause of its marginal effectiveness. This "subsidy" therefore does not
put manufacturers from different countries on an equal footing as the
Treasury Department maintains; it gives foreign producers a cost bene-
fit which American producers cannot match.
FOREIGN POLICY RATIONALE
Developments surrounding the judicial handling of the case indi-
cate that, in reality, it may have been foreign policy considerations that
swayed the court. On April 13, 1978, while the Zenith case was pend-
ing, the Government of Japan sent a letter to the Department of State
103 The following example will show how Japan's tax system favors the Japanese producers
and enables them to underprice their American competitors. The example is borrowed from
Nevin, Can U.S. Business Survive Our Japanese Trade Policy, HARV. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1978,
at 170 (Mr. Nevin is currently the president of Zenith Radio Corporation.)
Let us assume that products produced in both Country A and Country B are priced at $100,
including all taxes, when sold in the home market. Assume also that Country .4 assesses only
indirect taxes, Country B assesses only direct taxes, and the total of all taxes assessed in each
country equals 10 per cent of the value of those products. Next assume that A's indirect taxes are
remitted upon exportation. Finally, assume that freight and tariff costs are insignificant.
If a producer in Country .4 exports to Country B, then $10 of Country A's indirect tax will be
remitted upon the exported product. Thus, when selling in Country B, the producer from Coun-
try .4 could price his product at $90 against locally manufactured products that are priced at $100
and carrying the full burden of Country B's taxes. When a producer in Country B exports to
Country 4, he already would have paid $10 of direct taxes in his own country. These direct taxes
would not be remitted. When his goods enter Country A, they would be assessed the indirect tax
that applies to all products sold there. The products of Country B thus would be priced at $110,
that is $10 more than the local product. In either case, Country A's producers have the advantage.
In sum, when this analysis is applied to the instant situation the disadvantage at which American
producers operate is apparent. -
The possible inequities of this trade situation become clearer when one realizes that the great
majority of the United States' revenue comes from direct taxes while a significant amount of
Japanese revenue comes from indirect taxes. In 1974, for example, 88.4% of U.S. revenue came
from direct taxes. DEP'T OF COMM., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 249 (Table
No. 407) (1977). In comparison, Japan received 30.1% of its revenue from indirect taxes. H.
PATRICK & H. RosovsKY, ASIA'S NEW GIANT. HOW THE JAPANESE ECONOMY WORKS 328 (Ta-
ble 5-4) (1976).
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expressing its views regarding the possible ramifications of the Zenith
case.104 The letter stated that Japan considered the United States to be
bound under Article VI(4) of the GATT, which prohibits imposition of
countervailing duties upon nonexcessive remissions of indirect taxes. 105
It further stated that a Supreme Court decision directing the imposition
of countervailing duties would constitute a "clear violation" by the
United States of its GATT commitments and would infringe the rights
of Japan under GATT. l0 6 Moreover, an adverse decision might com-
pel Japan "to question the good faith of the United States."'' 0 7
On April 14, 1978, at the request of the State Department, Wade
H. McCree, the Solicitor General of the United States, sent the letter to
the Supreme Court.10 8 During the course of oral arguments, when Jus-
tice Blackmun read parts of the letter to the Court and inquired of the
Solicitor General as to its meaning, he was told: "We circulated it for
what it was worth. We don't suggest that this court should be respon-
sive to any threat or any apprehension of apocralyptic [sic] conse-
quences in the field of international trade."'1 9 Nevertheless, the
considerations embodied in the letter seem to have had an impact on
the decision.
As the Government of Japan noted in its letter, other United
States trading partners remit internal indirect taxes upon exported
goods." 0 Thus, a decision supporting Zenith's position would have
had an impact on far more than just the trade between Japan and
America. It would have affected all foreign trade with the United
States, possibly triggering a major trade war during the important To-
kyo Round of the GATT negotiations. In addition, the outcome of the
case would have had serious repercussions upon internal Japanese tax
policies if it had been decided in favor of Zenith.
Hence, the amicable relations of nations were at stake. In such
situations, American courts have traditionally taken into consideration
104 The letter, dated 13 April 1978 from the Embassy of Japan, as well as the cover letter from




108 See the cover letter in the Appendix infra.
109 Transcript of Oral Argument, Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, Sup. Ct. No. 77-539
(argued 4/25/78 and 4/26/78), as prepared by Hoover Reporting Co., Inc. (Washington, D.C.),
32-33. A moment later the Solicitor General stated that "the client of the government here is the
Secretary of State and not a foreign prince or potentate." Id. at 34. As the Court then pointed
out, the Solicitor General was supposedly representing the Secretary of the Treasury. Id. That is,
he was supposed to be arguing the Treasury Department's economic position, not the political
considerations of the Department of State. Id.
110 See the Appendix infra.
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the views of foreign governments and the Department of State when
the case at bar has serious foreign policy implications or raises ques-
tions of comity between nations."' 1 The Court in Zenith, however,
made no reference to these considerations in arriving at its decision.
Yet these considerations were before the Court. The principle of com-
ity thus helps to make logic out of an illogically reasoned opinion.
CONCLUSION
Some of the ramifications of Zenith are already known. On Sep-
tember 28, 1977, only two months after the Court of Customs and Pat-
ent Appeals rendered its decision, Zenith announced that it had been
forced to lay off about 5,600 American workers in order to compete
with the Japanese.112 The long-term implications of the Zenith deci-
sion, however, are less clear.
The U.S. domestic electronics industry will undoubtedly be im-
paired as a result of what is, in reality, unfair competition from foreign
producers. Moreover, now that the Supreme Court has indicated that it
will not become embroiled in the struggle between the legislative and
executive branches, the Executive may continue, for political reasons,
to refrain from imposing countervailing duties as it did in the Zenith
case.
The Court's analysis of such factors as the legislative history of the
countervailing duty statute, the economic theory upon which the Treas-
ury Department has based its position, the reliance interests that the
position of the Treasury has engendered, and the Downs and Nicholas
decisions is unpersuasive. While Congress has explicitly and repeat-
edly stated that the imposition of countervailing duties should not be
111 See Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1917); In re Grand Jury Investiga-
tions of the Shipping Industry, 186 F. Supp. 298 (D.D.C. 1960); New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co.
v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
21 Misc. 2d 1086, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, 155 N.Y.S.2d
340 (Sup. Ct.), arf'd, 2 App. Div. 2d 958, 157 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1956), a 'd, 3 N.Y.2d 862, 166
N.Y.S.2d 309 (1957), appeal dismissed, 356 U.S. 22 (1958). As one author has noted, however, the
actions of the State Department in these four cases suggest that the Department accords great
weight to foreign policy considerations when it is passing on requests for foreign sovereign immu-
nity. See Comment, The First Decade of/he Tate Letter Policy, 60 MICH. L. REv. 1142, 1144
(1962). In Weileman and Zinostenka, where the State Department granted the request for
sovereign immunity, the governments involved (Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia) had generally
strained relations with the United States. In Shipping Industry and Cuba Mail, which involved the
governments of Korea and the Phillipines, with whom the United States has generally had amica-
ble relations, the requests for sovereign immunity treatment were denied.
112 N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1977, § D, at 1, col. 3.
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sacrificed for political considerations,' 13 there is reason to believe that
such considerations contributed significantly to the Zenith Court's deci-
sion. This suggestion is even more persuasive when one notes that the
Court rendered a unanimous opinion, based primarily upon the 1897
Congressional floor debates, when none of the eight lower court judges
who had previously heard the case found those debates persuasive.
In response to Zenith, it is likely that American television manu-
facturers will lobby Congress to pass a new trade act which mandates
countervailing duties when indirect taxes are remitted upon exported
goods. 14 The Executive, however, which has praised the Zenith deci-
sion, "15 has indicated that it will attempt to resolve the problem of indi-
rect tax remissions through trade negotiations. 1 6 It is clear that the
optimal use of resources-and the resultant lower prices-that the Ex-
ecutive presumably desires to achieve through free trade' 17 cannot be
attained unless the comparative advantages' 8that nations possess are
not obscured by remissions of unequal indirect taxes.
Robert Dziubla
113 See text accompanying note 86 supra.
114 Interview with John Nevin, President of Zenith Radio Corporation, in Winnetka, Illinois
(October 18, 1978).
115 See Strauss United States Foreign Trade Policy. A Delicate Balancing Act, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 40 (1979).
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 In discussing the doctrine of "comparative advantage," Paul Samuelson maintains that re-
gardless of whether one country is absolutely more efficient than another, if each specializes in the
products in which it has a comparative advantage, ie., the greatest relative efficiency, trade will be
mutually profitable to both countries. P. SAMUELSON, supra note 99, at 673.
Another author has argued that an importing country should accept any cheaper product,
regardless of whether it is cheaper because of efficiency or subsidization. Barcelo, Subsidies and
Countervailing Duties-4nalysis anda Proposal, 9 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 779, 795 (1977). The
author then argues that, although the exporting country's government might remove the subsidy
later, thus raising the price, government subsidies are neither theoretically nor experientially less
predictable than market forces. Id. at 797. This argument, however, fails to consider the eco-
nomic dislocations and dysfunctions that will occur in the importing country when the subsidy
goes into effect and when it is removed. The cost to the importing country of switching those
resources freed by the imported subsidized products to other lines of production, and then switch-
ing them back when the subsidy is removed, may well outweigh any benefits accruing from the
subsidized product. He maintains that, in either case, the lower prices allow the importing country
to channel its now unused productive resources to other areas of production. Id. In short, "[t]he
freed resources represent a net gain." Id.
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APPENDIX
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
Washington, D.C. 20530
April 14, 1978
Honorable Michael Rodak, Jr.
Clerk
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D. C. 20543
Re: Zenith Radio Corporation v.
United States, No. 77-539
Dear Mr. Rodak:
I have been asked by the Department of State to submit to the Court the
attached note expressing the view of the Government of Japan on the above
case. I enclose the note and accompanying affidavit of Ms. Sharon E. Almad,
Department of State, and 10 copies for distribution to the Court.
Sincerely,
WADE H. McCREE, JR.,
Solicitor General
Enclosures
cc: Attached Service List
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The Embassy of Japan presents its compliments to the Department of
State and, in connection with the suit that the Japanese Government exempt-
ing internal commodity taxes on exportation of consumer electronics products
imported into the United States be subject to countervailing duty, has the
honor to state the views of the Government of Japan.
The United States Supreme Court has started to review a case, in which
the applicant, Zenith Radio Corporation is alleging that the action of the Jap-
anese Government exempting applicable internal commodity taxes on expor-
tation of consumer electronic products imported into the United States
constitutes a bounty or grant and is subject to countervailing duty under
United States law.
The issue presented to the Court, in the view of the Government of Japan,
has broad and far-reaching implications which could have serious effects, not
only upon trade between Japan and the United States, but also on world trade.
Accordingly, the Government of Japan, deeply concerned about the overrid-
ing importance of the matter presented in the context of international eco-
nomic relations, respectfully submits its following views on this subject:
1. In the view of the Government of Japan, the United States Government
should give due consideration to established international rules codified in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, to which both the United States and
Japan are signatory Contracting Parties, that the remission of or exemption of
exported merchandise from internal taxes such as commodity taxes does not
constitute export subsidies. Annex 1 Ad Article XVI of the GATT provides:
"The exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes borne by the like
product when destined for domestic consumption, or the remission of such
duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of those which have accrued, shall not
be deemed to be a subsidy." Accordingly, the exemption of Japanese com-
modity tax payments on exported merchandise (not to exceed the amount of
the commodity tax collected on the sale for home consumption of like mer-
chandise) is entirely consistent with and properly authorized by applicable
GATT provisions.
Article VI (4) of the GATT also provides: "No product of the territory of any
contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party
shall be subject to anti-dumping or countervailing duty by reason of the ex-
emption of such product from duties or taxes borne by the like product when
destined for consumption in the country of origin or exportation, or by reason
of the refund of such duties or taxes." Thus, the application of countervailing
duties for the exemption of exported merchandise from internal commodity
tax imposed on like merchandise sold for home consumption is not permitted
in the GATT. Following the decision of the United States Customs Court, the
Government of Japan took this matter up to the GATT, and its working group
drafted and issued a report on June 2, 1977, which was referred to and
adopted by the Council of the GATT on June 16, 1977. This report, embody-
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ing the latest official position of GATT, contains the following statements of
position addressed to the issues raised by the U.S. Customs Court decision.
(a) Commodity tax exemption on exported merchandise granted by
Japan is legally proper under the GATT.
(b) Should the decision of the United States Customs Court be sus-
tained and the assessment and collection of countervailing du-
ties commence, such action will constitute a clear violation by
the United States of its commitments under the GATT and a
direct infringement of the rights of the Government of Japan
thereunder.
(c) The withholding of appraisement on entries of consumer elec-
tronic products from Japan taken in response to the U.S. Cus-
toms Court decision also violates United States commitments
under GATT, and the resulting uncertainty distorts and seri-
ously jeopardizes international trade.
(d) The problems created by the action taken will adversely affect
not only trade in consumer electronic products, but its ripple
effect will also adversely affect world trade generally.
2. The exemption of internal duties and taxes on exports similar to the com-
modity tax exemption is widely practiced in the United States, European
countries, and other countries. Virtually all of the trading partners of the
United States have a similar system exempting internal indirect taxes on ex-
ported merchandise. If the final decision in the pending case holds that the
Japanese commodity tax exemptions on exports constitute subsidies subject to
the imposition of countervailing duties, it appears that exports to the United
States from other countries exempting duties and taxes on exports will also be
subject to the same action. Such a result cannot help but have a serious long
term impact on international trade, since each country exempting indirect du-
ties or taxes on exports is doing so in accordance with the clearly established
rules subscribed to by the Contracting Parties to the GATT. Thus, the Court
action, depending upon the final decision, could bring about a breakdown of
the GATT system itself and seriously impair the chances for success in the
current multilateral international trade negotiations.
3. The Government of Japan fully understands that the Government of the
United States is acting in good faith to honor its commitments to abide by
international rules. In the unlikely event that the United States should pro-
ceed in a manner violative of the very international rules in the establishment
of which it has taken leadership to further the objective of freer international
trade, those countries who joined with the United States in establishing such
rules to promote economic development through normalization of interna-
tional trade might be compelled to question the good faith of the United
States.
4. In view of the foregoing concerns, the Government of Japan expresses its
fervent hope that the United States will continue to take all appropriate action
in a timely manner to resolve this matter consistent with established interna-
tional rules.
